China the Onechild Policy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

China the Onechild Policy - Essay Example It emerged from the belief that development would be compromised by rapid population growth and that the sheer size of China's population together with its young age structure presented a unique challenge." (Kane and Choi, 1999). Therefore, a reflective analysis of the one child family policy in China confirms that it was developed and implemented in reply to the concerns about the social and economic consequences of the sustained fast growth of population in the country and the execution of the policy was more effective in urban areas than rural areas of China. One of the major criticisms of the policy has been that it brings about inequity against females, who are often aborted, abandoned, or unregistered and there are reports of fines, pressures to abort a pregnancy, and even forced sterilization in the case of second or subsequent pregnancies. The rigorous implementation of the policy became more difficult due to social and economic reforms. However, one of the most important con sequences of the policy has been that it eased some of the pressures of rapid population increase on communities and it has reduced the population of the nation by at least 250 million. In this paper, a profound analysis of the one child policy in China is carried out in order to point out some of the good and bad effects accompanying the policy. China: the good and bad effects of one-child policy The one-child policy, which comes under the official translation of family planning policy of the Chinese government, has been one of the very important steps taken by the government in order to control the population growth in the nation and the policy officially restricts the number of children to the urban couples. Introduced by the Chinese government in 1979 to deal with the social, economic, and environmental problems in China, this policy has affected around 35.9% of China's population today. It is essential to realize the various significant aspects of the policy in order to make a good analysis of the good and bad effects of one-child policy in China. In a reflective analysis of the essential aspects of the policy, it becomes lucid that "the aim was to curtail population growth, perhaps to 1.1 billion and certainly to 1.2 billion, by the year 2000. It was hoped that third and higher order births could be eliminated and that about 30% of couples might agree to forgo a second c hild. The ideal of a one child family implied that the majority would probably never meet it People were to be encouraged to have only one child through a package of financial and other incentives, such as preferential access to housing, schools, and health services." (Kane and Choi, 1999). Thus, the one-child policy was the result of a common realization that the sacrifice of second or third children was very essential for the sake of future generations of China which is the most populous country in the world. One of the crucial factors about China's one-child family policy has been that it has crucially influenced the lives of nearly a quarter of the world's population for more than a quarter of the century and it is essential to realize the good and bad effects of the policy. A background analysis of China's one-child family policy makes clear that the Chinese government embarked on this policy in 1979, following the economic stagnation of the

Human Resource Management Essay Example for Free

Human Resource Management Essay Human Resource Management (HRM) is the term used to describe formal systems devised for the management of people within an organization. These human resources responsibilities are generally divided into three major areas of management: staffing, employee compensation, and defining/designing work. Essentially, the purpose of HRM is to maximize the productivity of an organization by optimizing the effectiveness of its employees. This mandate is unlikely to change in any fundamental way, despite the ever-increasing pace of change in the business world. As Edward L. Gubman observed in the Journal of Business Strategy, the basic mission of human resources will always be to acquire, develop, and retain talent; align the workforce with the business; and be an excellent contributor to the business. Those three challenges will never change. Until fairly recently, an organizations human resources department was often consigned to lower rungs of the corporate hierarchy, despite the fact that its mandate is to replenish and nourish the companys work force, which is often cited—legitimately—as an organizations greatest resource. But in recent years recognition of the importance of human resources management to a companys overall health has grown dramatically. This recognition of the importance of HRM extends to small businesses, for while they do not generally have the same volume of human resources requirements as do larger organizations, they too face personnel management issues that can have a decisive impact on business health. As Irving Burstiner commented in The Small Business Handbook, Hiring the right people—and training them well—can often mean the difference between scratching out the barest of livelihoods and steady business growth†¦. With technology changing every day, and the talent crunch forcing employers to get the most out of each and every staff member, the focus on HR is set to continue. Even without a time machine, it’s clear HR’s role will move ever-closer to the very heart of business. Plugging the talent gaps This is not to say there are no challenges facing HR in the present day, far from it. At the top of the critical list on Singapore’s business landscape is the impending talent shortage that is set to hit organisations of all shapes and sizes. Elizabeth Martin-Chua, local HR expert and author, says businesses are again having to chase talent. Previously, the situation was the much more ideal reverse – with job candidates pulling out all stops to find work in their favoured organisations. Now, with the baby boom generation set to move into retirement with only smaller-sized age groups available to replace them, the talent crunch is set to move into a more permanent fixture. That means renewed importance will be placed on those HR

Osteogenesis Imperfecta Bone

Osteogenesis Imperfecta Bone Osteogenesis Imperfecta or more commonly known as Brittle Bone Disease, is a condition causing extremely fragile bones and is known to be a congenital disease. This means you are born with it. It is caused by a defect in the gene that produces type I collagen which is an important building block of bone. Most causes of Osteogenesis Imperfecta are inherited from a parent caring the gene . Some cases are the result of new genetic mutations. People with Osteogenesis Imperfecta are usually below average hight. Osteogenesis Imperfecta does not seem to occur in any certain race, it effects all races male and or female. A person with Osteogenesis Imperfecta has a 50 per cent chance of passing on the gene and the disease to there offspring. The symptoms of Osteogenesis Imperfecta are as follows: Type I which accounts for 60 per cent of all cases Most common and mildest type of Osteogenesis Imperfecta Bones predisposed to fractures. Most occurring before puberty Normal to near-normal stature loose joints with low muscle tone Bone deformity absent or minimal Spinal curvature Collagen structure is normal, but the amount is less than normal Triangular shaped face Sclera (whites of the eyes) usually have a blue, grey or purple tint to them Brittle teeth Hearing loss The increase liability to bruising (thought to be due to the defective collagen) Hernias are more common in people with Osteogenesis Imperfecta Excessive sweating or intolerance of heat are common complaints, the cause is unknown Type II Most sever form Death occurring shortly after birth, often due to respiratory problems Small stature with underdeveloped lungs Collagen is improperly formed Numerous fractures Severe bone deformities Type III Bones fracture easily Fractures often present at birth Short stature Sclera (whites of eyes) to be a blue, grey, or purple tint Loose joints Poor muscle development in arms and legs Triangular shaped face Barrel-shaped rib cage Spinal curvature Bone deformity, often severe Brittle teeth Hearing loss Respiratory problems Collagen is improperly formed The increase liability to bruising (thought to be due to the defective collagen) Hernias are more common in people with Osteogenesis Imperfecta Excessive sweating or intolerance of heat are common complaints, the cause is unknown Type IV Between Type I and Type III in severity Bones fracture easily, usually before puberty Shorter than average stature Sclera are white or near white, normal in color Mild to moderate bone deformity Barrel-shaped rib cage Triangular shaped face Spinal curvature Brittle teeth Hearing loss Collagen is improperly formed The increase liability to bruising (thought to be due to the defective collagen) Hernias are more common in people with Osteogenesis Imperfecta Excessive sweating or intolerance of heat are common complaints, the cause is unknown The diagnoses of Osteogenesis Imperfecta. Osteogenesis Imperfecta is diagnosed a few different ways. In most cases the diagnosis is made from the pattern of fractures. In severely affected people X-rays may show characteristics abnormalities. In the USA two specialized tests are sometimes used for the diagnosis of Osteogenesis Imperfecta. One involves taking a small piece of the skin, culturing the cells and chemically examining the collagen produced. The other uses a blood sample and searches for mutations of the genes coding for the collagen of bone. Neither tests are more than 85 per cent accurate in identifying cases of Osteogenesis Imperfecta. Chronic Villus Sampling maybe done during pregnancy to determine if the fetus has the condition. However, because so many different mutations can cause Osteogenesis Imperfecta, some forms can not be diagnosed with a genetic test. Often the severe form Type II can be detected on an ultra sound when the fetus is as young as sixteen weeks old. The treatment of Osteogenesis Imperfecta. There is no cure yet for this disease however curtain therapies can reduce pain and complications due to this disease. Bisphosphonates are drugs that have been used to treat Osteoporosis. They can increase the strength and the hardness of bone in people with Osteogenesis Imperfecta . They have also been shown to highly reduce fracture rate. Swimming and low impact exercises help maintain the strength of the bones. In more severe causes surgery may be used to place metal rods into long bone in the leg to help reduce the risk of any further fractures.

The Importance of Effective Writing for an 8th Grade Language Arts Portfolio :: essays research papers

One of the most important questions in writing is what is effective writing? Well, the definition of effective writing is how well the writing impacted someone, i.e. the reader. You can write whatever you want to, but if it isn’t effective then it is almost pointless. In order to change someone’s opinion or in order to prove them wrong you need to make a large impact with what you are writing. There are six steps in order to make a piece of writing effective. These steps include convincing the reader, making the information comprehensible, making it easy to read, making the whole paper interesting, exhibit a clear and confident voice, and try to impact the reader emotionally. First off, included in the convincing the reader step is using the active voice instead of using the passive voice. For example use baseball player play baseball instead of baseball is played by baseball players. For the second criteria, comprehensible, eliminate words that are not essential to th e meaning or mood. For example do not use very, really, terribly, and awfully. For the third criteria, easy to read, combine short sentences to consolidate ideas, but don’t ramble, be effective. For example use the effective sentence when I dropped a boiled egg, it landed on my dog without breaking. Rather than the ineffective sentence I dropped an egg and it landed on my dog. The egg was boiled and it did not crack open. For the fourth criteria, making the whole paper interesting, vary the structure of you sentences. For example try using something interesting like I like to play baseball. I own seven baseballs and 2 baseball bats. Instead of using something boring like I own seven baseballs. I also own 2 baseball bats. I like to play baseball. For the fifth criteria, exhibit a clear and confident voice, reword redundant and words phrases. Ex. Use It is hot. Instead of it is a hot one. Finally, for the sixth criteria, try to impact the reader emotionally, consider having a t arget audience. By having a target audience you can impact the reader whom it is most important to you very easily. For example if you are trying to excite an environmentalist about a paper product then emphasize that it is recyclable, instead of its annual consumption. In order of importance these traits are ranked 1.) Comprehendible- if the reader can not understand what you are saying, then they have no reason to read it.

Declaratory Theory

â€Å"Declaratory theory is propounded on the belief that judges' decisions never make law, rather they only constitute evidence of what the law is. However, this view is no longer accepted. There are three reasons for the persistence of the declaratory theory. In the first place, it appealed in the separation of powers. Secondly, it concealed the fact that judge-made law is retrospective in its effect and finally, when the judges confronted with a new, unusual, or different point, they tend to present as if the answer is provided by the common law.One of the most widely-accepted principles of the English legal system is what is known as the ‘declaratory theory' of judicial decision-making. This principle states that when judges are required to make decisions, they do not create or change the law, they merely ‘declare' it. That is, a judge says what he or she finds the law to be; no ‘new' law is ever created by judges. New law comes from Parliament. For example, th e Criminal Justice Bill that is currently going through Parliament will make fairly radical changes to the criminal law.It will take away the blanket immunity that currently exists from being prosecuted twice for the same offence. No-one is suggesting that this Bill declares the law: the ancient ‘double-jeopardy' principle has existed for centuries. When the Bill is enacted, the law will simply change. This article attempts to show, first, that the declaratory theory itself is based on indefensible assumptions of fact. Second, it shows that the theory sometimes leads to bizarre conclusions, which can only be avoided by the most strained reasoning.Finally, it examines why the theory commands so much reverence, when most academics and many judges believe it to be fatally flawed. Why the declaratory theory is factually indefensible The classical exposition of the declaratory theory is that of Lord Esher in Willis v Baddeley (1892): There is, in fact, no such thing as judge-made l aw, for the judges do not make the law, though they frequently have to apply existing law to circumstances as to which it has not previously been authoritatively laid down that such law is applicable.That judges appear to create and change law is undeniable; cases like Donaghue v Stevenson, Hedley Byrne v Heller, and Wednesbury represent significant developments in the law. In Lord Esher's view, the judges in these cases would simply be applying existing principles to new fact situations. But where do these existing principles come from? Some of them, no doubt, come from previous case law. When a judge is called on to decide a case, most often a decision can be made by looking at previous cases whose facts are similar to those at issue, and reasoning from them.Very often there will be previous cases that are binding on a particular court, and these will dictate the outcome. But unless we are to accept an infinite regress of case law, back to the very dawn of time, there must be some point in the past at which an issue was first decided. The romantic view is that the earliest judicial decisions were made by the ‘wandering justices' of the 13th century, who travelled the land at the King's behest, applying and unifying the existing law of the land.The pragmatic view is that the English common law results from an attempt by the Norman French nobility to apply its standards of law in a conquered country, while giving an illusion of continuity. Whether the legal developments of the medieval period followed from a process of approving established legal custom, or from the imposition of a foreign jurisprudence, neither represent an answer to the question where the foundational principles come from. There are really only two possibilities: either they were, at some point, created by the judges, or they were based on existing ‘universal truths' that were self-evident to the judges.The declaratory theory repudiates the notion that the judges ‘made thin gs up', so the only alternative is that they were based on universal truths. The notion that law is based on fundamental, self-evident principles of ethics is often called ‘natural law' jurisprudence. To be fair, the idea of ‘natural law' has had a bit of a revival in the last fifty years or so, after being out of favour since the 18th century. The idea that the declaratory theory can be traced back to natural law therefore does not attract the same scepticism today as it would have in the 19th century.The problem with natural law is that even if one is prepared to accept its basic tenet, that there indeed are self-evident principles of ethics, it is by no means obvious that every situation that requires a judicial decision is one in which such fundamentals are at issue. Consider, for example, the well-known case of Entores v Miles Far East Corp (1955). This concerned the formation of a contract by telex machine, in the very early days of this technology.Previously most formal business transactions would have been carried out by post; the ‘postal rule' was – and still is – that if person A offers to contract with person B, then the contract is formed when B's letter of acceptance is posted to A. This is the case even if B's acceptance never even reaches A. When considering the use of telex, the court had to decide whether the same principle could be applied to telex as to post, that is, whether a telexed acceptance was effective on sending, or on receipt. The leading judgement in Entores was given by Denning LJ.In his judgement he does not refer to any existing case law, or any legal principle. Instead, he says that it is simply reasonable and obvious that a telex must be received to be effective. If the declarative theory is correct, then Denning's judgement cannot be creating law: it must be declaring what the law is. But since he does not refer to any existing law, it must, presumably, be derived from universal principles. No w, a proponent of natural law may believe it is self-evident that, for example, murder and rape are wrong.But it takes a real leap of faith to believe that there are principles of natural law at stake in deciding when a telexed contract is formed. The reality, of course, is that when Entores was heard, no-one really wanted to see the ‘postal rule' extended to a new technology. Denning's judgement is an entirely pragmatic one. It does not require any higher principles to be considered. In summary, the declaratory theory is predicated absolutely on acceptance of a natural law view of jurisprudence, not just for fundamental principles of ethics, but for everything.This, I suggest, is just too much to swallow. Why the declaratory theory produces bizarre results Law students generally know about the ‘retrospectivity of the declaratory theory'; but it doesn't seem to be well understood that this is not a doctrinal matter, or something that can be argued either way, it is an in evitable conclusion of the declaratory theory. If a judicial decision cannot create new law, then when the judge declares the law, as a matter of plain logic he is declaring what the law always was. In the Entores example discussed above, this does not create a problem.It established that the use of telex had certain legal consequences, but since telex was only just coming into use when this decision was made, the fact that Denning was declaring what the law was is of no consequence. It is purely a matter of academic discussion whether the ‘postal rule' would have applied to telex in, say, the 15th century. It is, surely, of not practical consequence. Perhaps the first occasion on which the full implications of the declaratory theory had to be confronted squarely by a court was in the case of Kleinwort Benson v Leicester CC.Here, the House of lords had to rule on what should have been, for a court of this standing, a routine matter. The question at issue was whether money was recoverable in a restitution action, if it was paid from one party to another in a mistaken understanding of law. It had always been the case that money paid under of a misunderstanding of fact was recoverable. It was widely believed that the inability to reclaim money paid under a mistake of law was unjust, and incompatible with other legal principles and other jurisdictions.Both parties to the case, and all five of the law lords, were in agreement on this point: it should be possible to recover money paid under a mistake of law. The disagreement was on whether the decision that it was recoverable should apply only to new cases, or to past cases. Kleinwort Benson, a bank, had already paid its money to the defendant local authority. It therefore argued that the decision should operate retrospectively, so it could reclaim its money. The Local Authority, on the other hand, argued that the decision should not have retrospective effect.The problem was that if the issue were decided in f avour of the claimant bank, it must have retrospective effect. This is a direct consequence of the declarative theory. After all, if the law at time T1 was X, and it is later changed at time T2 by judicial ‘declaration' to Y, then the effect of that declaration is to deem that the law at T1 was Y as well. Of course, no-one at time T1 knew this, and so a decision made on the basis that the law was X, not Y, was necessarily mistaken. You may be wondering why this would have such dramatic consequences.Well, a potentially large number of businesses could suddenly find that the they had grounds for litigation arising from things that happened in the distant past, and which they had no way of knowing at the time would be actionable. No-one would wish to see a barrage of ancient, poorly-remembered cases dragged up before the courts in the hope of gain. For technical reasons which I don't have space to explain here, the Limitations Act would not prevent this. So the Law Lords were fac ed with a problem.They could decide justly, in favour of the claimant bank, by ruling that it could recover its money, and accept the inevitable problems that the retrospectivity of its decision would bring. Or it could decide against the claimant, and avoid the problems, but at the expense of leaving in place an unjust and criticised rule of law. It was simply not open to the judges to change the unjust law, without the change being retrospective, unless they were prepared to openly attack the declarative theory. It is interesting to see how the various judges attempted to deal with this problem.It should be noted from the outset that all the Law Lords in Kleinwort Benson agreed that, in practice, judicial decisions do change the law, rather than simply declaring it. No-one suggested for a moment that the declaratory theory was actually true. For example, Lord Goff says: It is universally recognised that judicial development of the common law is inevitable. If it had never taken pl ace, the common law would be the same now as it was in the reign of King Henry II†¦ However, there was very little enthusiasm for making an official pronouncement to that effect.We will discuss possible reasons for this later. Lord Browne-Wilkinson proposed a judicial damage-limitation exercise. He suggested that although the declaratory theory should be upheld, it could be prevented from giving rise to actions arising out of past conduct. †¦ retrospection cannot falsify history: if at the date of each payment it was settled law†¦ [the claimants] were not labouring under any mistake of law at that date. The subsequent decision †¦ could not create a mistake where no mistake existed at the time.In other words, what he seems to be saying is that although the claimants did in fact err in law, they had not made a mistake of law, so they could not reclaim their payments. This is quite a neat trick, because it upholds the revered declaratory theory, while preventing it giving rise to an undesirable situation. However, it does rely on accepting that there are two different metas of ‘mistake of law'. One meta occurs when a person misunderstands the law that actually subsists at the time he applies it, and which continues to subsist.The other meta occurs when a person correctly understands the law at the time he made the decision, but his understanding was later made wrong by a judicial decision. Even if one accepts this arbitrary and unfounded distinction, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that it is unjust. If a person makes a mistake of law, and the law remains the same, then the mistaken person can reclaim any money paid as a result of that mistake. On the other hand, a person who later finds that he was mistaken as a result of judicial decision cannot reclaim anything.Yet the latter person is blameless: his decision has been ‘wronged' by later events beyond his control. The former person could at least (in theory) have disc overed what the law was. The effect of the Browne-Wilkinson solution is to leave the declaratory theory intact, at the expense of justice and common sense. Lord Goff showed, perhaps, the greatest reverence for the declaratory theory: I can see no good reason why your Lordships' House should take a step which, as I see it, is inconsistent with the declaratory theory of judicial decision as applied in our legal system†¦As a result, he was prepared to allow a person to recover money paid under a decision in law which was correct at the time, and later shown to be false. In his analysis, the claimant was labouring under a mistake of law, but simply did not know it. Lord Goff correctly analysed the effect of the retrospectivity of the declaratory theory, and allowed it to stand despite the odd results it engenders. Lord Hoffman recognised the problems that would follow from finding for the claimant, but decided that they were a price worth paying for doing justice in the particular case: This may suggest that your Lordships should leave the whole question†¦ o the legislature†¦ There is obviously a strong argument for doing so, but I do not think that it should prevail over the desirability of giving in this case what your Lordships consider to be a just and principled decision. Lord Hope decided along much the same lines as Lord Goff. Of the five Law Lords, Lord Lloyd was the only one to criticise the declarative theory: It follows that†¦ the House of lords is doing more than develop the law. It is changing the law, as common sense suggests†¦ If this view of what happens is inconsistent with the declaratory theory of the court's function, then it is time we said so.It always was a fairy tale. And: For myself, I would want to allow the appeal, if I could, [avoiding the effect of retrospectivity]. But as that is not to be, I consider the second best course is to leave the abolition of the mistake of law rule to Parliament. He seems to be sayi ng that a decision for the claimant, coupled with the effect of the declaratory theory, will produce results so bizarre and unpredictable that it ought not to be allowed. In other words, the price of doing justice in this case is too high.Legal retrospectivity is bad enough in the civil law, but in the criminal law it becomes a human rights issue. Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights specifically forbids criminal sanctions for an act that did not constitute a crime at the time it was committed. In other words, however heinous we might think an act is, it can't be punished unless the offender had a way to know it was illegal. Of course, ‘ignorance of the law is no defence', but the offender has to be able to know the law to be bound by it. Consider the famous House of lords case of R v R (1994).This concerned a man who raped his wife, and based his defence on the fact that for a man to rape his wife was not, in fact, illegal. It may be condemned, it may even be wicked, but it was not – at that time – illegal. If a man had approach a solicitor in 1990 and said ‘Look, I'm thinking of raping my wife, is that illegal? ‘ a competent solicitor may well have said: ‘Well, of course I wouldn't condone it, but the balance of authority is that it isn't actually illegal'. He could have cited authorities going back to the 16th century to back this up.At this time, there was increasing pressure on Parliament and the courts to overturn this unedifying principle of law, but when R was heard, no action had been taken. To cut a long story short, the House of lords decided that marital rape was illegal, reversing a 400-year tradition. Everyone, with the exception of the defendant, heaved a sigh of relief. Later that year, the decision was put on a statutory basis, which appeared to settle the matter once and for all. The fly in the ointment is our old friend retrospectivity. The decision in R was not that marital rape was i llegal, but that it had always been illegal.Again, the court had no power to decide otherwise. And this means that an octogenarian who raped his wife in the 1940's could now be prosecuted. You may feel that this is a just conclusion; you may feel that rapists should get their just deserts. However, the fact remains that we would be punishing a person for something which was not illegal at the time, and which he would have no way of knowing was ever going to be illegal. The social conditions of the time may not even have led our hypothetical defendant to think he was doing anything wrong.But he could still be prosecuted. This may sound far-fetched, but in fact within a year of the decision in R, cases were being heard in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). SW v United Kingdom (1995) concerned a man who was prosecuted in 1994 for a rape he had allegedly committed in 1990. If was far from obvious that marital rape was illegal in 1990. The ECHR upheld the criminal conviction, on the basis that when the rapes occurred, the defendants could have reasonably foreseen that the criminalisation of martial rape was likely.The problem with the decision in SW v UK is that it suggests that a person must govern his behaviour, not by what the law is, but by what he predicts it will be when any consequent prosecution is bought. So, not only is ignorance of the law no defence, but ignorance of the future development of the law is also no defence! None of the forgoing is intended to condone the practice of marital rape. Judicial retrospectivity presents the same kind of problem for any criminal offence, of any severity. Lord Diplock has suggested that the retrospectivity of judicial decisions discourages judges from correcting defects in the law.Judges have to be very conservative if they must predict not only the effect of their decisions on new cases, but the effect they would have had if made in the past. To get around this problem, the Supreme Court of the USA has adop ted the device of ‘prospective overruling'; this device allows the court to state that a decision that changes the law is not to have retrospective effect. The problem is that prospective overruling is simply incompatible with the declaratory theory. If the former comes in, the latter must go. However, as Prof.Zander says, the courts can accept that the declaratory, retrospective effect of its decisions is doctrinally ‘correct', while at the same time letting it be known that they will decide cases on the basis of the law as would have been understood when the events occurred, not when the case is heard. This is a fudge, but probably a workable fudge. Why is the declaratory theory so revered? In Albion's Fatal Tree (1975), Douglas Hay argues that the decline in formal religious observance in the 18th century left a power vacuum to be filled by the law.For law to command the respect of society in the way that the church had done, it was necessary that it be seen as someth ing above and beyond its practitioners: The punctilious attention to forms, the dispassionate and legalistic exchanges between counsel and the judge, argued that those administering the laws submitted to its rules†¦ In short, it's very inefficiency, its absurd formalism, was part of its strength as ideology. Such an ideology would be undermined, of course, if it were seen that law were nothing more than the creation of ordinary people.It was the job of the legal profession to form an elite, and thereby shield the ugly reality of lawmaking from public scrutiny. While this argument may have had validity in the 18th century, it is not at all easy to see that it stands up in the 21st century. To respect the law, we don't necessarily need to view it as having supernatural origins. Moreover, since the 18th century the development of the law has increasingly been effected by statute. No-one expects Parliament's legislative programme to be to be guided by anything more than the views o f society as expressed through the ballot box.Nevertheless, while most judges tacitly accept that their activities have the effect of lawmaking, relatively few have been prepared to criticise the declaratory theory in public. Lord Reid is usually credited with first describing the declaratory theory as a ‘fairy tale'; in a 1972 article ‘The judge as law-maker' in JSPTL he described the ‘Aladdin's cave' in which ‘those with a taste for fairy tales' expect the common law to be found. However, he was not the first influential judge to cast doubt on the declaratory theory. For example, Lord Radcliffe wrote in the Law Society Gazette in 1964 †¦ here was never a more sterile controversy than that upon the question whether a judge makes law. Of course he does. How can he help it? Such comments are, to say the least, unusual. Prof. Atiyah is probably the most outspoken critic of the modern judicial attitude to the declaratory theory. In Judges and Policy ([1980] ILR 346) he identified five reasons for its continued existence. First, it is to the advantage of the judge if he can, in a difficult case, deflect any criticism of his own decision onto ‘the law' as a higher principle.As Atiyah says, of course, this can be seen as a ‘shabby attempt to evade responsibility'. Nonetheless, the job of a judge is difficult enough, without having to deal with personal attacks on his decisions. Lord Devlin has suggested that judges will occasionally hint to claimants that they wish they could find otherwise, but are bound by ‘the law'. Second, it is generally accepted as a constitutional principle that it is the role of the legislature to make law, and the role of the judiciary to interpret it in specific cases. Where judges do make law, they should do so within narrow constraints.There is undoubtedly some virtue in this principle. The most famous exponent of judicial creativity in modern times is almost certainly Lord Denning. His view was very much that it was the job of the judge to ‘do justice'; if that meant that principles of law had to be bent to fit, that was a price worth paying. The problem is that his decisions do not generalise. It is often difficult for later judges, reading his reasoning, to determine whether the decisions he made are based on law that ought to be applicable in other cases, or to fact situations particular to the case under consideration.This is evidenced by the fact that many of the principles that he established by doing the right thing in a particular case have come to be misapplied in later cases, and have had to be circumscribed by later judges. For example, his decision in Solle v Butcher (1949) that a contract could be set aside on ‘equitable grounds' when entered under a mutual mistake, did justice in the case itself. This decision was followed in a large number of cases, but it was never entirely clear what would amount to ‘equitable grounds'.Finally, in 20 03 the case of The Great Peace more or less demolished the entire concept of ‘mistake in equity' and put this branch of law back where it was 50 years ago. Even if judicial creativity can do justice in the present case without compromising later decisions, there are other reasons why judicial creativity should be constrained. Judges are only able to deal with cases they hear; it is difficult for them to take a wider view of any issue. Judges are not well-placed to make decisions that involve elements of social policy.In addition, arguably judges are drawn from a much narrower section of society than MPs, and therefore less representative. Third, Atiyah argues that judicial lawmaking is tolerated only because it is not exercised openly. Lord Devlin has argued (Judges and lawmakers [1976] 39 MLR 11) that if the courts are given, or arrogate to themselves, the power to make decisions without retrospective effect (and thereby demolish the declarative theory) this will amount to an approval to engage in judicial law-making in the large.While we accept that development of the law requires an occasional exercise of judicial creativity, the fact that it has to be done on the sly means that it won't be done all that often: Paddling across the Rubicon by individuals in disguise†¦ is better than the bridging of the river by an army in uniform with bands playing. Atiyah's fourth argument is that many judges themselves have a naive and simplistic view of their own lawmaking role.They frequently speak or write as though the only alternative to a slavish devotion to the declaratory theory is the wholesale abandonment of the doctrine of precedent and the separation of powers. Judges frequently invoke Seldon's old chestnut about the law varying with the length of the Lord Chancellor's foot as a reason for their own conservatism. However, there is no reason to assume that a disavowal of the declaratory theory need signal the end of the doctrine of precedent (it has n ot done so in the USA), or the dissolution of the separation of powers.The fifth argument is that public respect for the judiciary depends on their strict and evident impartiality. If the judge was seen to create or change law, the implication is that the judge prefers one view of law to another. But, as Atiyah says, there is no reason to believe that the public will respect a judge that is impartial but unjust, more than one that is partial but fair. Judicial adherence, at least in public, to the declaratory theory may be for the very best of motives.However, in a well-educated, democratic society, it is doubtful whether it is ever appropriate for the governing classes to espouse one point of view in public, and a different one in private. Not only is it intellectually dishonest, it is doubtful whether it is necessary. Moreover, it is a strategy that is unlikely to work for much longer. It seems unlikely that the public will be moved to increased confidence in the judiciary, when i t becomes obvious that the judiciary have practised a paternalistic and patronising form of misinformation for all these years. â€Å"

Analysis of Decision-Making Model Essays

Analysis of Decision-Making Model Essays Analysis of Decision-Making Model Essay Analysis of Decision-Making Model Essay We all make determinations of changing importance in the workplace every twenty-four hours. so the thought that determination devising can be a instead sophisticated procedure may at first seem unusual. However. surveies have shown that a big per centum of people are much poorer at determination doing than they think. An apprehension of what determination doing involves. together with an effectual techniques. will assist bring forth better determinations. Decision devising is the survey of placing and taking options based on the values and penchants of the determination shaper ( Harris. 1998 ) . Making a determination implies that there are alternate picks to be considered. and in such a instance we want non merely to place as many of these options as possible but to take the 1 that best tantrums with our ends. desires. life style. values. and so on. To make this I will use Rick Robert’s 7 Step Decision Making Model and use it to a recent work-related d etermination. I will besides depict how critical thought impacted this determination. The 7 Step Decision MakingModel by Rick Roberts has. you guessed it. seven different stairss. The first measure is to place the determination to be made. Under this measure. one will besides hold to find whether you are doing a pick between two or more options. The following measure is to understand yourself. What skills. involvements. values. and personality do you hold? The 3rd measure is to place the options. What are the current options and are there others available. Step four is to garner information and information. Take a expression at bing resources and place extra information and resources that may be needed. Step five is to measure the options. List the pro’s and con’s of each option. Identify the value and demands that are met by each. Acknowledge any hazards. present and future. involved with each option. The following measure. measure six. is to choose one of the options. If you don’t hold adequate information to choose one of the determinations. so reappraisal or revise one of the above stairss. The concluding measure is to plan a class of action to implement the determination. This 7 Step Decision-Making Model helped me with a recent determination that needed to be made at my occupation. I was offered a sidelong publicity. which would necessitate me to travel from one location to another. I used the different stairss to find whether I should accept the place. First I identified the determination that needed to be made and that I had two picks. whether I should accept this new place or non. Following I evaluated myself. Did I possess the accomplishments to execute this new occupation? Did the place tantrum with my personality? The 3rd measure determined my options. which were to accept the place or base on balls on the offer. My following measure was to garner all the information on the new place. I researched the occupation duties. radius with other employees who were executing the same occupation. and toured the new location that I would be working at. Following I evaluated the pros and cons of my determination. The pros were that I would be interacting with a new client base. spread outing my capablenesss as an employee and doing myself more marketable for a future publicity. the new environment was less nerve-racking. and I would be able to interact with other sections more. The cons of my new place would be that I would hold a longer distance to go to work. I would be unfamiliar with my new duties and would be larning from abrasion. and eventually I would be traveling into a smaller office. Following I moved on to step six and selected one of my options and decided to accept the place that was being offered. I so followed step seven by set uping a meeting with my supervisor and manager to rede them of my pick. Critical thought was really of import in doing this determination. since I needed to do a determination based on the benefits of my pick instead than allowing emotions guide me. Critical thought is make up ones minding rationally what to or what non to believe ( Norris. 1985 ) . Rick Robert’s 7 Step Model helped see that I looked at my picks from different angles and removed the factors that would non hold efficaciously influenced me. Decisions can be much more complex than they appear. Since our mundane lives and success is dependent on our ability to efficaciously place and put to death these determinations. it is indispensable that we find a method to this. I hope that Rick Robert’s 7 Step Decision-Making Model has given you a tool to hone this procedure.